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Pleading

-

Lack of Jurisdiction as a Defense

in Federal Courts
Plaintiff, a citizen of Pennsylvania, instituted a tort action
in a federal district court against a corporate defendant. Defendant filed an answer admitting that the plaintiff's action was a
common law action based on diversity of citizenship. Subsequently, and four days before the running of the applicable state
statute of limitations, the defendant filed a motion to amend its
answer to allege defendant was incorporated in two states, one
being the state of plaintiff's citizenship, and moved to dismiss
for lack of jurisdiction. Held: Motions denied. Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 15 (a) grants discretion to the court to permit
or deny the amendment, and to allow the amendment in the face
of the running of the statute of limitations would be unjust.,
Omitting cases where a federal question is involved, the important prerequisite for federal jurisdiction is diversity of citizenship. 2 It has always been a requirement that the petition allege
diversity of citizenship, and failure to do so constitutes grounds
for dismissal or reversal which the court will grant on its own
initiative. 3 The problem of when and by what method the defendant may raise a jurisdictional question, when jurisdiction is
alleged, has not always been the same.
Prior to 1875 jurisdiction could be challenged only at the trial
stage by way of a plea in abatement in actions at law and by plea
or demurrer in equity actions. 4 Failure to challenge jurisdiction
by these methods resulted in a waiver of the defense. 5 In the
Act of 18756 Congress provided:
If.. .it shall appear to the satisfaction of the.. .[District] Court,
at any time after such iuit has been brought or removed thereto,
that such suit does not really and substantially involve a dispute or
controversy properly within the jurisdiction of said [District] Court
I Klee v. Pittsburgh & W. V. Ry., 22 F.R.D. 252 (W.D. Pa. 1958).
2 Formerly Jud. Code, § 24(1), 28 U.S.C. § 41(1) (1911).
Now 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1331, 1332, 1341, 1342, 1345, 1354, 1359 (1948).
3 Mattingly v. Northwestern V. R.R., 158 U.S. 53 (1895).
4 See McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 183 (1935).
5 See note 4 supra.
6 Act of March 3, 1875, c. 137, § 5 (18 Stat. 472). After the enactment
of the Judicial Code of 1911 the subject matter of this section was
contained in Jud. Code, § 37, 28 U.S.C. § 80. This section was omitted
in the 1948 amendment as unnecessary.
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... the said [District] Court shall proceed no further therein, but
shall dismiss the suit or remand it to the court from which it was
removed....
In 1884 the Supreme Court decided the leading case of Mansfield, C. & L. M. R.R. v. Swan7 under the Act of 1875. Over the
objection of the plaintiff a contract case was removed by the
defendant to a federal court. After trial, judgment was rendered
for the plaintiff and on appeal the defendant questioned the jurisdiction of the court. The Supreme Court held that jurisdiction
was an absolute requirement and not only could not be waived,
but should be determined by the trial court, even though no question of jurisdiction was raised by either party, whenever the question of jurisdiction was suggested.
In 1886 the Supreme Court in Hartog v. Memory s cast doubt
upon the holding of the Mansfield case. In a contract action,
plaintiff alleged diversity and the defendant filed an answer on
the merits. In the course of the trial testimony was given which
raised doubt as to the citizenship of both parties. The defendant's
motion for dismissal for lack of jurisdiction was granted summarily.
On appeal the Supreme Court reversed, holding that even though
the Act of 1875 granted a trial court power, without motion by
a party, to dismiss the suit whenever a fraud on its jurisdiction
was discovered, neither party had the right, without a proper
pleading, to introduce and rely upon evidence to show a lack of
diversity where the plaintiff alleged diversity and the defendant
answered, and that the lower court erred when it dismissed summarily without giving the plaintiff an opportunity to rebut or
control the questioning testimony. The Supreme Court made no
mention of the Mansfield case in its opinion.
In 1889 the Supreme Court in Morris v. Gilmer9 reviewed the
Hartog case. This was an action in equity where the averment
of diversity was made and an answer was filed. Before final
hearing the defendant moved for dismissal for lack of diversity
of citizenship, which motion was denied. On appeal the holding
was reversed and the court affirmed the wording in the Mansfield
case. The court held that there was no particular mode in which
the facts showing lack of jurisdiction had to be brought to the
attention of the court and that the language of the Hartog case
did not mean otherwise, the grounds there being failure to give

7

8

U.S. 379 (1884).
113 U.S. 588 (1886).
Ill

9 129 U.S. 315 (1889).
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the plaintiff a chance to rebut the defendant's claim of lack of
diversity.
In Hill v. Walker 10 a court of appeals considered the foregoing cases, and many subsidiary cases. Plaintiff alleged jurisdiction in a contract action and the defendant filed a general denial in his answer. At the trial some testimony was introduced
concerning citizenship. On appeal the defendant attempted to
raise the question of jurisdiction and the court of appeals held
that although the objection could be raised in any manner below,
and that a general denial might be sufficient, the burden of proof
was on the defendant to show lack of diversity to the satisfaction
of the trial court. This interpretation of the case permitted a
jurisdictional objection to be raised at any time, but placed the
burden of proof upon the one questioning the. jurisdiction. This
would present an interesting question if the court raised the objection.
This issue of the burden of proof came before the Supreme
Court in McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.". The Court
held that the plaintiff must allege all elements of jurisdiction in
the pleadings, and that even where alleged, if challenged by the
defendant, the plaintiff must bear the burden of proof in supporting them. Where they are not challenged, the trial court may
insist that the jurisdictional facts be established. The Court in
holding that the Act of 1875 applied to both equity and law actions
reversed that part of
considered the Hill case and by implication
12
the holding concerning burden of proof.
This was the last Supreme Court or court of appeals opinion,
which considered in detail the question of federal court jurisdiction
based on diversity of citizenship until after the adoption of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938.13 In 1940, the major
cases, and the effect of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, were
considered at length by the Court of Appeals of the 7th circuit in
Page v. Wright.1 4 In this equity action the plaintiff's pleading
contained an averment of jurisdiction, and the defendant's answer
admitted jurisdiction. Summary judgment was entered for the
plaintiff on his motion. The defendant then attempted to file an
amended answer showing a lack of diversity of citizenship and
10 167 F. 241 (8th Cir. 1909).
11 298 U.S. 178 (1936).
12 McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936).
1"'Title 28 U.S.C.
14 116 F.2d 449 (7th Cir. 1940), Cert. denied, 312 U.S. 710 (1940).
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moved to dismiss. The district court denied the motion. On
appeal, the court of appeals held that jurisdiction could not be
conferred by agreement, consent or collusion of the parties, whether
contained in their pleadings or otherwise, and that a party can
not be precluded from raising the question, by any form of laches,
waiver or estoppel.15 The court continued, saying that raising
of the jurisdictional issue is not left to the court's discretion since
Rule 12 (h) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure specifically
provides: ". . . that, whenever it appears by suggestion of the
parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter the court shall dismiss the action." The court held
that Rule 12 (h) continues in effect the language of the Act of
1875 (which was codified as 28 U.S.C. § 80 in 1911) and that there
was no discretion left to the court under either Rule 12 (h) or

28 U.S.C. § 80.

Since 1940, the cases follow the view adopted in the Page
case. In all these cases the question of jurisdiction came up
prior to appeal to the court of appeals. However, the holdings
have been uniform that whether the question is raised in the
answer,16 subsequent to the answer but prior to trial, 17 during
trial,'8 or after trial but before appeal, 19 the question may be
raised and there is no waiver or estoppel.
Although the effect of repeal of 28 U.S.C. § 80, in the 1948
revision of Title 28, on the decision in the Page case, has been
raised by text writers, 20 there seems no reason for a 2different
1
result in view of Rule 12 (h) and the Revisor's comments.
Emphasis added. See note 14 supra at 453.
16 Mifls v. Journeymen, 83 F.Supp. 240 (W.D. Mo. 1949); Hackner v.
Guaranty Trust, 117 F.2d 95 (2d Cir. 1941).
17 Parmeflee v. Ackerman, 252 F.2d 721 (6th Cir. 1958); Fugle v. United
States, 157 F.Supp. L81 (D. Mont. 1957); Carstens v. Great Lakes
Towing, 71 F.Supp. 394 (N.D. Ohio 1945); Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Pan
Am., 57 F.Supp. 980 (S.D.N.Y. 1944); Clemente Eng. Co. v. DeLiso
Constr., 53 F.Supp. 434 (D. Conn. 1944); Farr v. Detroit Trust, 116
F.2d 807 (6th Cir. 1941).
Is Ambassador East v. Orsatti, 155 F.Supp. 937 (E.D. Pa. 1957). Reversed
on other grounds 257 F.2d 79 (3d Cir. 1958) which cited with approval
Page v. Wright, supra.
19 Lee Wing Wong v. Dulles, 214 F.2d 753 (7th Cir. 1954); Zank v. Landon,
205 F.2d 615 (9th Cir. 1953).
'5

20

HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 720 (1953).

21 See comments following FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h).

Also see the discussion

concerning the revisor's notes in Page v. Wright, supra.
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In view of the consolidation and clarification of the problem
of questioning jurisdiction, as set out in the Page case, and which
has been uniformly followed in the lower federal courts to date,
the decision in the instant case seems in error.22 The court apparently overlooked Rule 12(h) and its effect of withdrawing
from the discretion of the court the question of whether or not
to have a hearing on the question of jurisdiction, and the running
of the statute of limitations, while regretable is not grounds for
23
finding federal jurisdiction.
As long as corporate defendants incorporated in a single state,
the dilemna which faced the plaintiff in the instant case did not
often arise. However, when corporations began incorporating in
more than one state, and thus obtained dual citizenship for purposes of jurisdiction, 24 the burden on the attorney, seeking to
ascertain before filing suit in the federal court whether or not
the required diversity existed, became more onerous. In 1958
Congress amended 28 U.S.C. § 1332 by adding a new subsection
which provides that a"...
corporation shall be deemed a citizen
of ... the State where it has its principal place of Business ...
Since the effective date of this amendment, the plaintiff's attorney
must not only ascertain in what states the corporate defendant is
incorporated, but must also gauge what state possesses the defendant's principal place of business. To the extent that the
plaintiff's attorney errs on either of these conclusions, the problems presented by the instant case may arise.
Donald E. Leonard '60

Note that there is dictum in both Gavin v. Hudson & M. R.R., 185
F.2d 104 (3d Cir. 1950) and Ambassador East v. Orsatti, 257 F.2d 79
(3d Cir. 1958), the court of appeals under which the district court
in the instant case is placed, to the effect that there can be no
waiver or estoppel of the raising of the question of jurisdiction. The
court in the instant case while citing the Gavin case does not make
mention of the language in that case to this effect.
23 Gilbert v. David, 235 U.S. 561 (1915).
24 Jacobson v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 206 F.2d 153 (1st Cir. 1953).
Affirmed 347 U.S. 909 (1954). But see Gavin v. Hudson & M R.R.,
185 F.2d 104 (3d Cir. 1950).
25 - Stat. - (1959).
22

